This study analyzes the impact of local mandatory calorie labeling laws implemented by New York jurisdictions on body weight. The analysis indicates that on average the point-of-purchase provision of calorie information on chain restaurant menus reduced body mass index (BMI) by 1.5% and lowered the risk of obesity by 12%. Quantile regression results indicate that calorie labeling has similar impacts across the BMI distribution. An analysis of heterogeneity suggests that calorie labeling has a larger impact on the body weight of lower income individuals, especially lower income minorities. The estimated impacts of calorie labeling on physical activity, smoking, and the consumption of alcoholic beverages, fruits, and vegetables are small in magnitude, which suggests that other margins of adjustment drive the body-weight impacts estimated here.
INTRODUCTION
Obesity remains a major public health problem in the U.S. In 2009-2010, one in three adults was classified as obese, and no state in the nation had met the Healthy People 2010 objective of reducing the adult obesity rate to 15% . Obesity increases the risk of morbidity and treating obesity-related illness imposes substantial healthcare costs on society. A recent study estimated that, in 2006, among Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, per capita medical spending was 36-47% higher for obese individuals than for non-obese individuals (Finkelstein et al., 2009) . Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012) estimated that obesity causes annual medical costs to rise by $3022 (in 2008 dollars), which amounts to about 6% of median household income in 2008.
Changes in the food environment and unhealthy eating habits are important to understanding the recent rise in obesity.
1,2 For example, there has been a dramatic increase in the consumption of food from restaurants, which tend to offer energy-dense and nutrient-poor food (Currie et al., 2010; Anderson and Matsa, 2011) .
The estimated share of daily calories consumed coming from restaurants and fast-food establishments more than tripled between 1977 and 2008 (Lin and Guthrie, 2012) .
While the provision of nutrition information on packaged foods has been mandatory in the U.S. since the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA) took effect, foods sold or served in restaurants were exempted from this requirement. Recently, several U.S. jurisdictions have mandated that chain restaurants post calorie counts on menus in order to improve access to nutrition information at the point of purchase and to facilitate better informed and healthier choices. The New York City (NYC) health department was the first to implement a local calorie labeling law in July 2008 and six New York (NY) county health departments quickly followed suit by implementing similar laws in 2009 and 2010. 4, 5 The first contribution of this study is that it provides the first estimates of the impact of calorie labeling laws on body mass index (BMI) and the probability of obesity. Previous work has focused on estimating the response of purchase behavior to calorie information posted on menus in restaurant settings, e.g. by studying whether consumers choose lower calorie meals or buy fewer items. 6 However, behavioral changes may occur outside the restaurant setting as well. For example, individuals may use the calorie information they observe on menus to decide how much to eat later in the day, they may substitute consumption toward non-chain restaurant meals, and there are many other potentially important margins of adjustment. And in addition to demand-side changes, supply-side responses to calorie labeling laws (e.g. the introduction of low-calorie menu items or reformulation to reduce the caloric content of existing products) could also have an impact on body weight.
This study exploits within-county variation in the availability of calorie information posted on chain restaurant menus over time brought on by implementation of mandatory calorie labeling laws and the differential timing of implementation across NY counties to identify the effect of calorie labeling on BMI. This empirical approach allows estimation of the overall impact of calorie labeling on body weight, which may operate through a wide variety of behavioral responses to calorie information posted on menus, both inside and outside of chains, as well as supply-side responses. The analysis indicates that on average implementation of calorie labeling laws in NY led to economically important and statistically significant reductions in BMI and the risk of obesity.
The second contribution that this study makes to the literature is that it adds to the understanding of the channels through which calorie labeling affects consumer behavior, by analyzing whether calorie labeling induces changes in exercise, smoking, or dietary behavior as measured by a limited set of food and beverage items captured in the BRFSS. The estimated effects of calorie labeling on physical activity, smoking participation, and alcohol, fruit, and vegetable consumption are statistically insignificant and too small to explain the body-weight impacts of calorie labeling estimated here.
The third contribution of this study is that it sheds additional light on whether estimation of the average effect of calorie labeling masks heterogeneity in the responsiveness to calorie information posted on chain restaurant menus (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2009 . Quantile regression point estimates are similar in size across the BMI distribution and are not significantly different across quantiles. While I find that the estimated effects of calorie labeling on body weight are larger for some groups relative to others (e.g. women versus men), the estimates from different pairs of subsamples are generally not significantly different from each other. 7 An important exception is suggestive evidence that calorie labeling has a larger impact on the body weight of lower income individuals, especially lower income minorities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, I review the literature on the effectiveness of calorie labeling on menus in chain restaurants. Second, I summarize the data sets used in the analysis. Third, I describe the empirical approach employed in the study, explain the results of the analysis, and explore several mechanisms that may drive the results. Last, I provide a discussion of the results and conclude.
PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Many studies have examined whether calorie labeling induces individuals to make healthier choices in restaurant settings.
8,9 Elbel et al. (2009) found that calorie labeling had no impact on the calories purchased in several fast-food chain restaurants, despite the fact that 27% of those seeing calorie counts reported using them. Similarly, while Tandon et al. (2011) found that calorie labeling caused a significant increase in parents seeing nutrition information, they found no evidence that calorie labeling decreased calories purchased for either children or parents. Finkelstein et al. (2011) used transaction data from a Mexican fast-food chain and found that calorie labeling had no impacts on in-store or drive-through purchase behavior. Bollinger et al. (2011) found that calorie labeling in Starbucks resulted in a modest average reduction of 14 calories purchased per transaction, which was driven by changes in consumers' food choices and not beverage choices. 10 Wisdom et al. (2010) found that assigning calorie-labeled menus to diners at a fast-food sandwich chain caused them to order about 61 fewer calories-a reduction that was due to side-dish and drink choices and not sandwich choices. Ellison et al. (2013) found that, while assignment of menus with calorie counts in a full-service restaurant reduced entrée calories, it did not significantly reduce calories from other sources such as drinks and desserts.
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The studies discussed above suggest that the impact of calorie labeling on calories ordered may depend on the menu items or type of establishments under consideration, which creates some ambiguity regarding the overall impact of calorie labeling laws. Compensatory behavior may also have important implications for the overall impact of providing calorie information. For example, Roberto et al. (2010) found that, in an experiment that took place in an university classroom, diners assigned a calorie-labeled menu ordered fewer calories during a study meal but offset this calorie reduction by consuming more calories later in the day.
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There is also evidence that supply-side responses to calorie labeling laws may have a beneficial impact on the nutrient content of restaurant foods. Namba et al. (2013) found that implementation of local calorie labeling 7 It is important to note, however, that I may be lacking power in the subsample analyses to establish that the body-weight impacts of calorie labeling are larger for some groups than others. 8 There are also many studies analyzing hypothetical menu item choices and purchase intentions. These studies used survey or laboratory experiment data and generally found evidence suggesting that calorie labeling decreases the calories of hypothetical purchases, decreases purchase intentions, and increases intentions to purchase lower calorie meals (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2013) . 9 A recent meta-analysis by Long et al. (2015) found that calorie labeling is associated with a statistically significant reduction of 18 calories ordered per meal; among controlled studies, however, calorie labeling is found to be associated with a statistically insignificant reduction of 8 calories per meal. Another recent meta-analysis (Littlewood et al., 2015) found that calorie labeling is associated with a statistically significant reduction of 78 calories ordered per meal. 10 They also found that calorie labeling had larger impacts on the purchase behavior of women and individuals who were high-calorie purchasers before calories were posted on menus. 11 In addition, they found that, among diners assigned a calorie-labeled menu, the reduction in calories ordered was larger for those who were less 'health conscious' compared with those who were more 'health conscious'. In similar studies, Ellison et al. (2014a Ellison et al. ( , 2014b found that random assignment of calorie-labeled menus did not significantly reduce total calories ordered but the addition of a symbolic traffic light did significantly reduce total calories ordered. 12 A third group of diners was assigned a menu with calorie information and a statement about the recommended daily caloric intake for an average adult. These diners also ordered fewer calories than those who were assigned a menu with no calorie information, but this reduction was not offset by increases in calorie consumption later in the day.
laws caused a 5% increase in what they refer to as 'healthier adult entrées' on fast-food chain restaurant menus. 13 And in a survey of NYC chain restaurant managers, Bollinger et al. (2011) found that, among managers who reported changing their menus at least once a year, the probability of managers indicating that a lowcalorie option was added to their menu in the past 6 months was higher for NYC chains that were required to comply with calorie labeling requirements (chains with 15-20 locations nationwide versus those with 10-14).
In sum, evidence that calorie labeling reduces the amount of calories purchased in chain restaurants is mixed.
14 Unlike previous studies that focus on the first-stage impact of calorie labeling, this study evaluates whether calorie labeling laws lead to a reduction in body weight. The strength of the empirical approach used here is that it allows measurement of the overall impact of calorie labeling on body weight, which may operate through a variety of demand-side and supply-side responses. To complement the body-weight analysis, I also investigate the importance of mechanisms related to dietary behavior, smoking, and physical activity. The literature suggests that the impact of calorie labeling on consumers may not be uniform across individuals, which motivates an analysis of heterogeneity in the impact of calorie labeling on body weight.
DATA
The main analysis draws on data from selected state files of the 2004-2012 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). The analysis sample is composed of individuals who reside in NY counties and counties in the NY-NJ-PA Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) that did not implement a calorie labeling law over the study period. The total number of observations in the 2004-2012 BRFSS for these counties is 136,471. I drop 6109 observations because county information could not be identified.
15 Self-reported height and weight are used to calculate an individual's BMI. 16 I drop 7080 observations because of missing information on BMI. To address the concern that outliers are driving the results, I drop 127 observations for which BMI is below 10 or above 60. 17 The main regression analysis controls for the following individual-level information: age, gender, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, family income, number of children, and marital status. The main estimation sample consists of 103,220 individuals, for whom information on county of residence, BMI, and all the above-mentioned demographics is available.
I obtained county-level information on the timing of calorie labeling laws from the Center for Science in the Public Interest. The adoption and effective dates of these laws were verified using local law documentation retrieved from county health department websites. Figure 1 shows the law adoption and effective dates by 13 Bleich et al. (2015a) and Bleich et al. (2016) found that in recent years large chain restaurants have significantly reduced the number of calories in newly introduced menu items, which they argue may be in anticipation of federal menu labeling regulations. Bleich et al. (2015b) found that restaurants that voluntarily posted calorie information had lower average per-item calorie content than those that did not. Bruemmer et al. (2012) found that, among menu items that were on menus 6 and 18 months after calorie labeling requirements were implemented in King County WA, there were improvements in the nutrient content of chain restaurant entrées. 14 A closely related literature examines whether the provision of nutrition information on packaged foods has beneficial impacts on health as measured by body weight. The findings in this literature are also mixed. Using a differences-in-differences estimation approach that compares nutrition label users to non-users, Variyam and Cawley (2006) found that the implementation of NLEA was associated with a decrease in BMI among only one group-non-Hispanic white females. Drichoutis et al. (2009) employ a propensity score matching approach and found no evidence that nutrition labeling affects body weight. And Loureiro et al. (2012) estimate switching regression models and found that nutrition labeling reduces the body weight of both men and women, but has a larger impact on the body weight of women. 15 The county identifier is suppressed for BRFSS respondents who reside in a county with fewer than 50 respondents or adult populations less than or equal to 10,000 residents. 16 Cawley (1999) developed a procedure to address empirical problems associated with self-reported height and weight data. Studies that have employed this correction have found that coefficient estimates in regressions involving measures of body weight as a dependent variable are not sensitive to using the correction (Chou et al., 2004, Gruber and Frakes, 2006; Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002) . Below, I also examine the sensitivity of my results to correcting for reporting error in height and weight, using the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). I choose not to employ this correction in the main analysis because the NHANES is representative of the U.S. non-institutionalized civilian population and not representative of NY state. 17 Dropping these individuals does not affect the results of the analysis.
jurisdiction. 18 Policy variables in the analysis are coded according to the exact date of a respondent's interview. Previous work has documented a relationship between economic conditions and BMI (e.g. Ruhm, 2005) . For this reason, county unemployment rates are controlled for throughout the regression analysis. County-level unemployment rates were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and were merged with the BRFSS analysis sample by month and year.
All the NY counties that implemented a calorie labeling law over the study period are metropolitan counties, which might be a cause for concern with respect to differences between counties that did and did not implement a law over the sample period.
19 For example, time-varying differences in a county's urbanicity, sentiments toward healthy behavior, or availability of healthy food may be related to body weight and a county's decision to implement a calorie labeling law. I address this concern by controlling for the following county-level information from the County Business Patterns in the analysis: the number of fitness and recreation centers, fastfood restaurants, full-service restaurants, grocery stores and supermarkets, convenience stores, and specialty food outlets. And, finally, I control for other county or state policies that may affect body weight: smoke-free laws, cigarette taxes, beer taxes, and soda taxes. Information on these policies was drawn from Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights, The Tax Burden on Tobacco, Brewer's Almanac, and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, respectively. Table I Research Service. A county is classified as metropolitan or non-metropolitan based on categories of economic dependence and policyrelevant themes. Examples of economic factors that contribute to a county's metropolitan status include its manufacturing-and services-dependence, and examples of policy-relevant factors include the fraction of a county's low-educated population and population loss. These codes may be accessed here: www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/county-typology-codes.aspx (last accessed May 14, 2016). 20 In Appendix Table AI (available on the publisher's website), I also show additional sample summary statistics for subsets of the control group that I make use of in the robustness check section.
METHODS AND RESULTS

Main analysis
An important concern is that differing BMI trajectories between treatment and control groups leading up to the period over which jurisdictions began to implement calorie labeling laws may cause overestimation or underestimation of treatment effects. I examine this by plotting BMI means by treatment county and year of implementation. Figure 2 shows that in the years leading up to implementation years, BMI trends for treatment counties and the control group tend to be similar. 21 While the control group's BMI is generally increasing over the sample period, BMI tends to shift downward for treatment counties in implementation years-although the duration of the policy effect appears to vary by county. And in some cases, there are anticipatory patterns that 21 It is important to note that there is greater sampling variation around BMI means among small counties, which, in some cases, makes it more difficult to establish that BMI was trending in a similar fashion in treatment and control counties. After presenting the main results, in the robustness check section, I carefully investigate the implications of this issue by examining how the estimated effect of calorie labeling on body weight changes after excluding from the regression sample respondents with relatively few other respondents in a countyyear.
could be because of the fact that some chains were posting calories prior to a county's effective date or that BMI may respond to a neighboring county's implemented policy. Below, I further explore these trends by examining the average duration and timing of policy effects, as well as the importance of policy spillover effects. The pre-implementation trends by and large lend credibility to the identification assumption of parallel trends between treatment and control groups made in the empirical analysis below and the post-implementation trends suggest that implementation of calorie labeling laws lead to reduced body weight. To estimate the effect of calorie labeling on body weight while also controlling for other potentially important observed and unobserved factors, a panel regression model of the following form is estimated,
where Y is either BMI or an indicator for whether an individual i residing in county c at time t has a BMI greater than or equal to 30; X is a vector of individual-level characteristics; Z is a vector of county-specific characteristics; CL e is an indicator for whether a respondent's county of residence c has implemented a calorie labeling law as of time t; CL a is an indicator for whether a respondent's county of residence c has adopted but not implemented a calorie labeling law as of time t 22 ; γ c is a county fixed effect; γ t is a time fixed effect; γ c *t are county-specific linear time trends; and ε is an idiosyncratic error term. This model nets out secular trends in 22 I include a law adoption policy variable in the regression model because, for some treatment counties, exposure to calorie counts in chain restaurants began before effective dates of local laws. Chain restaurants were notified 6-12 months before effective dates about the adoption of a local calorie labeling law, and were asked to comply before or on the effective date to avoid fines and penalties. In personal communications with representatives of county health departments, I learned that some chain restaurants were posting calorie counts on menus before effective dates. For example, a representative from Albany's Department of Health indicated that about 15% of chain restaurants were in compliance before its law's effective date. Also, while NYC's mandatory calorie labeling law became effective in July 2008, Bollinger et al. (2011) report that Starbucks locations in NYC began posting calorie counts on menus in April 2008. body weight across time, all time-invariant heterogeneity across counties, and also controls for unobserved factors that move in a linear fashion over time and vary by county. 23, 24 The coefficient of interest is β 3 , which measures the overall impact of implementation of calorie labeling laws on body weight.
In Table II , I present results from the specification shown in equation 1. The analysis indicates that on average implementation of calorie labeling laws reduced BMI by 0.4 units and decreased the probability of obesity by 3 percentage points. Relative to sample means in 2007, the regression estimates indicate that on average calorie labeling caused BMI to fall by 1.5% and the risk of obesity to fall by 12%. In contrast, while the coefficient estimates of the impacts of the adoption of calorie labeling laws on body weight are also negative, they are much smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
25 Taken together, the results indicate that on average implementation of calorie labeling laws in NY-after which all rather than a subset of affected chain restaurants were posting calorie counts on menus-caused an economically important and statistically significant reduction in body weight.
Robustness checks
Before turning to analyses that investigate the timing of the policy's impact, the importance of several mechanisms, and whether there is heterogeneity in the impact of calorie labeling on body weight across individuals, I conduct a battery of robustness checks.
First, there may be policy spillovers to neighboring counties when a calorie labeling law takes effect. If residents of neighboring control counties commute to treatment counties on a regular basis, for example, not accounting for commuting patterns could cause underestimation of the effect of calorie labeling on body weight. I examine this by estimating a model where a separate indicator variable is included to designate a neighboring but not implementing county. Inclusion of this indicator produces slightly smaller calorie-labeling implementation effect estimates (row 1 of Table III ), suggesting that policy spillovers do not cause significant attenuation in estimation.
26 Interestingly, the coefficient estimates of the neighboring indicator variable are negative, which is suggestive of beneficial policy spillovers, but the estimates are small and imprecise.
Second, one may be concerned that treatment and control counties are insufficiently similar because, for example, all the local jurisdictions that implemented calorie labeling laws in NY are metropolitan counties. Instead of using all the counties that never implemented calorie labeling over the study period as the control group (as in Table II) , I test for sensitivity of the results to changing the composition of the control group by using three subsets of these counties: (i) only NY counties; (ii) only metropolitan counties in NY; and (iii) counties that are in the NY-NJ-PA MSA and in NY regions that contain at least one implementing county.
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Rows 2-4 of Table III show that the estimates from regressions that use these alternative control groups are similar-albeit somewhat larger in magnitude-to those in the main analysis. This suggests that issues related to geographical clustering of policies and urbanicity are not a problem for the analysis.
Third, business cycles have been shown to affect health outcomes including BMI (e.g. Ruhm, 2005) . I have controlled for unemployment rates throughout the analysis, but it is possible that the impact on health of economic conditions varies across counties in ways that affect a county's policy environment. In row 5 of Table III, I present results from a model that allows the effect of unemployment rates on body weight (25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65+) , gender, race and ethnicity dummies (black, other race, Hispanic), education dummies (HS graduate, some college, 4-year college graduate or more), # of children, indicator for married, log of family income, and a dummy for whether a county's calorie labeling law has been adopted but not implemented. Also included but not shown: unemployment rate, # of fast-food restaurants, # of full-service restaurants, # of fitness and recreation centers, # of supermarkets and grocery stores, # of convenience stores, # of specialty food stores, cigarette taxes, beer taxes, soda taxes, and a dummy for whether a county has a 100% smoke-free law. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and are in parentheses below OLS coefficients. All regressions used sampling weights. *, **, and, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. outcomes to vary by county. Allowing for heterogeneous impacts of local economic conditions by county causes only small changes in the estimated effects of calorie labeling on body weight, suggesting that issues related to economic conditions-such as the 2008 financial crisis-and the timing of county-level implementation of calorie labeling laws do not drive the results. Fourth, one might be concerned that time-changing unobserved factors that vary by county may be nonlinear, and thus not well captured by county-specific linear time trends. In row 6 of Table III, I show results from a specification that includes county-specific quadratic time trends. The results are similar to the main results and suggest that, for example, nonlinear trends between upstate and downstate NY, which were differentially affected by calorie labeling laws, are unlikely to account for the results.
Fifth, because BMI is based on self-reported height and weight data, I show results from analyses that employ a correction for reporting bias in self-reports of height and weight (row 7 of Table III) . 28 The main results are similar to those obtained when the correction is used, which is consistent with the findings of other studies that have employed this correction (Chou et al. 2004, Gruber and Frakes, 2006; Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002) .
Sixth, one may be concerned about the potential for policy endogeneity. For example, 9 of the 11 county health departments that implemented a calorie labeling law also implemented a law restricting the use of partially hydrogenated oils (PHOs) in restaurants ('trans fat bans'). 29 In addition, NYC engaged in other initiatives that might have influenced body weight at around the same time that it implemented its calorie labeling law.
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To reduce the risk of policy endogeneity, I present results from regressions in which I control for county-level trans fat bans (row 8 of Table III ) and results from dropping NYC from the analysis (row 9 of Table III ). Both sets of results are similar to the results in the main analysis, which suggests that policy endogeneity is unlikely to account for the results.
Seventh, I conduct a placebo test. Implementation of calorie labeling laws may have impacts on health behaviors such as those related to diet and exercise, but it should not have any meaningful impacts on other health behaviors such as vaccinations. Row 10 of Table III shows that the estimated impact of calorie labeling on the probability of obtaining a flu shot is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, which lends further credibility to the body-weight analysis.
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Eighth, I perform a lead-lag policy analysis to examine the timing of the policy's impact on body weight.
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The results are summarized in Figure 3 . The regression coefficients prior to the implementation period are small in magnitude and are not jointly significant at conventional levels (p-value 0.148). In contrast, regression estimates in the post-implementation period are larger and jointly significant at the 10% level (p-value 0.076). The policy's impact on body weight, however, appears to be concentrated in the first year of the law's 28 Following Cawley (1999) , I used the 2007-2008 NHANES, and regressed measured height (weight) on self-reported height (weight), separately by gender and race/ethnicity. Estimates from these regressions were then multiplied by the self-reported measures of height and weight in the BRFSS data set. 29 While there is a strong link between trans fat intake and cardiovascular disease (CVD), there is very little evidence linking trans fat consumption to weight gain or obesity (e.g. see Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition, 2007). Also, while Restrepo and Rieger (2016) found evidence indicating that implementation of trans fat bans in NY counties led to an important reduction in CVD mortality rates, changes in obesity rates did not explain the CVD mortality reduction. Some county health departments implemented PHO restrictions over 2 phases where, generally, Phase I allowed the use of trans-fat-containing oils in some foods while in Phase II the ban applied to oils in all foods. The trans fat ban policy variable is coded according to a county's earliest implementation date (see Restrepo and Rieger [2016] for information on the timing of the trans fat bans). implementation. While the second and third year's estimated impacts are economically important, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero (p-value 0.168) (Cantor et al., 2015) .
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Finally, the BRFSS is not designed to be representative of counties and, in some cases, the number of respondents in a county-year is small. This explains the greater variance around BMI means for the smaller counties shown in Figure 2 . I examine whether the results are sensitive to setting different thresholds for the minimum number of respondents in a county-year, which, as shown in Appendix Table II, affects the sampling variance around the (county-year) mean BMI of the observations used in the regression analysis. In columns 2-6 of Appendix Table II (available on the publisher's website), I show that steadily increasing the minimum number of respondents in a county-year produces estimates that hover around À0.4, which is similar to the main estimate (reproduced in column 1 of Appendix Table A2) . 34 This exercise suggests that using all counties in the analysis rather than honing in on only the largest counties, which are subject to less sampling variance in the dependent variable over time, does not substantively alter the results. First, the effect of calorie labeling on body weight may vary across the BMI distribution if, for example, overweight individuals are more responsive to calorie labeling than normal-weight individuals. Table IV Second, I analyze whether the effect of calorie labeling on body weight varies by gender, race/ethnicity, income, and education. 36 Panel A of Table V shows that the estimates are larger for women relative to men, larger for minorities relative to non-Hispanic whites, larger for below-median income individuals relative to higher income individuals, and larger for individuals with some college or more relative to those with less education. For each pair of subsamples, except for the two income groups, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated impacts are equal across regression models. The estimates for the two income groups are significantly different from each other at the 10% level (p-value 0.086).
To further investigate the heterogeneity by income, I explore heterogeneity in the estimated body-weight impacts among subsets of the lower income group of respondents. The estimated body-weight impacts for men and women are similar in magnitude and are not significantly different from each other. And while the estimated body-weight impact of calorie labeling among individuals with a high school degree or less is only about 60% as large as the estimated impact among more educated individuals, the estimates are not significantly different from each other. The estimated body-weight impact of calorie labeling is over 7 times larger for minorities than for non-Hispanic whites-both in terms of differences in coefficient estimates and relative to 2007 sample means-and these estimates are significantly different from each other at the 10% level (p-value 0.063).
The impact of calorie labeling on body weight may be larger among lower income minorities because they are either more exposed to calorie information in chain restaurants, or, because they are more responsive to the information. The former might result from more frequent visits to chain restaurants and the latter might result if calorie labeling produced a stronger shock to the nutrition information sets of lower income minorities relative to non-Hispanic white counterparts. 37 Another possible explanation is that there could have been supply-side responses to calorie labeling laws that impacted the offerings of restaurants most visited by lower income minorities. 36 It is important to note, however, that stratification produces smaller sample sizes that often lead to less precise estimates, which limits my ability to make comparisons across groups. 37 The BRFSS lacks the necessary information to shed light on these issues, but information from the 2007-2008 NHANES provides some support for these interpretations. For example, I estimate that, in a sample of NHANES respondents with a family income of below $63,793 (to match the median family income in the BRFSS analysis sample), minorities on average report having more fast-food meals in the past week (2.4) than do non-Hispanic whites (1.9). Minorities in this lower income sample are on average also more likely to report that they would often use nutrition information (0.39) to decide what to order if it were readily available in restaurants than are nonHispanic whites (0.34). These patterns may be taken to suggest that calorie labeling laws may have caused a greater reduction in body weight among lower income minorities because of their more pronounced exposure or intention to use nutrition information in chains. Note: Controls included but not shown: age group dummies (25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65+) , gender, race and ethnicity dummies (black, other race, Hispanic), education dummies (HS graduate, some college, 4-year college graduate or more), # of children, indicator for married, log of family income, and a dummy for whether a county's calorie labeling law has been adopted but not implemented. The following county-level information is also included but not shown: unemployment rate, # of fast-food restaurants, # of fullservice restaurants, # of fitness and recreation centers, # of supermarkets and grocery stores, # of convenience stores, # of specialty food4.4. The effect of calorie labeling on dietary behavior, physical activity, and smoking participation As discussed above, most studies have analyzed how on-site purchase behavior responds to calorie information posted on menus, but there are many other potential margins of adjustment. I explore whether 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65+) , gender, race and ethnicity dummies (black, other race, Hispanic), education dummies (HS graduate, some college, 4-year college graduate or more), # of children, indicator for married, log of family income, and a dummy for whether a county's calorie labeling law has been adopted but not implemented. Also included but not shown: unemployment rate, # of fast-food restaurants, # of full-service restaurants, # of fitness and recreation centers, # of supermarkets and grocery stores, # of convenience stores, # of specialty stores, cigarette taxes, beer taxes, soda taxes, and a dummy for whether a county has a 100% smoke-free law. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and are in parentheses belowcalorie labeling induces individuals to change their smoking habits, physical activity, or some dietary behaviors. 38, 39 The results are summarized in Table VI . There is no evidence that physical activity responded to implementation of calorie labeling laws. The estimated effect of calorie labeling on the extensive margin of exercise is small in magnitude-indicating about a 0.7% decrease in exercise participation relative to the 2007 sample mean-and statistically insignificant (column 1 in Table VI) . And the estimate presented in column 2 in Table VI-which captures the combined calorie-labeling effect on exercise participation and intensity-is statistically insignificant and, relative to the 2007 sample mean, translates into an increase in physical activity of about 30 min per week. Increasing physical activity by 30 min burns about 130 calories, so this estimated impact is the equivalent of an increase in caloric expenditure of 19 calories per day.
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I also find small and statistically insignificant impacts on fruit/vegetable and alcohol consumption (columns 3-4 in Table VI ). Relative to 2007 sample means, the estimated effects indicate a reduction of 0.1 units of fruit and vegetable servings a day and an increase of 0.01 units of alcohol per day. The estimated impact of calorie labeling is equivalent to a reduction of about 5 calories in fruit and vegetable consumption, and an increase of 1 calorie from alcohol.
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38 Information on exercise on the extensive margin of exercise and alcohol consumption is available for the full sample period, but information on the intensive margin of exercise, fruit, and vegetable consumption is available only for 2005 , 2007 . 39 In 2007 , BRFSS respondents whose weight changed between the time of their interview and a year prior to their interview were asked whether the change in weight was intentional. The effect of calorie labeling on the probability of a respondent responding in the affirmative is imprecisely estimated but it is economically important (coef 0.055, se. 0.058). Relative to the 2007 sample mean, this is an increase of about 13%. The estimated effect of calorie labeling is larger among those who lost weight (coef 0.087, s.e. 0.057) than among those who gained weight (coef 0.037, s.e. 0.072). These results may be viewed as suggestive evidence that, at least for the subgroup considered in this subsample, calorie labeling induced demand-side changes. 40 This estimate is based on an increase in the most popular form of exercise (walking). According to WebMD (see http://www.webmd.com/ diet/healthtool-fitness-calorie-counter, last accessed May 14, 2016), for a person of average weight in my sample, walking on a level surface for 30 min burns about 130 calories. 41 These are based on my calculations of average calories in a serving of fruit, vegetables, and a unit of alcohol. I obtained calorie information for the 20 most frequently consumed raw fruits and vegetables from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and calculated the average over all of these fruits and vegetables (see http://www.fda.gov/food/ingredientspackaginglabeling/labelingnutrition/ucm063367. htm, last accessed May 14, 2016). An average serving of fruit contains 68.25 calories, and an average serving of vegetables contains 33.5 calories. On average, one beer contains 150 calories, one glass of wine contains 120 calories, and 1.5 ounces of liquor contain 100 calories (Nielsen et al., 2012) . Note: Controls included but not shown: age group dummies (25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65+) , gender, race and ethnicity dummies (black, other race, Hispanic), education dummies (HS graduate, some college, 4-year college graduate or more), # of children, indicator for married, log of family income, and a dummy for whether a county's calorie labeling law has been adopted but not implemented. The following county-level information is also included but not shown: unemployment rate, # of fast-food restaurants, # of fullservice restaurants, # of fitness and recreation centers, # of supermarkets and grocery stores, # of convenience stores, # of specialty food stores, cigarette taxes, beer taxes, soda taxes, and a dummy for whether a county has a 100% smoke-free law. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and are in parentheses below OLS coefficients. All regressions used sampling weights. *, **, and, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
To the extent that people smoke to control their weight, 42 it is possible that calorie labeling could affect smoking behavior. However, in column 6 of Table VI, I show that the impact of calorie labeling on smoking participation is also small and statistically insignificant. 
Plausibility of estimated effect sizes
Using a specification similar to the one shown in the main analysis (equation 1 with weight as a dependent variable and adding height as an explanatory variable), I find that on average calorie labeling reduces body weight by 1.23 kg [95% confidence interval (À2.10, À0.36)]. This reduction in body weight can be explained by a persistent average daily energy imbalance gap between intake and expenditure of about 45 calories per day for a year. 44 Relative to the average daily energy intake in the U.S., this is a reduction of about 1.8%.
45
While the effects are imprecisely estimated, it is useful to calculate the implied body-weight effects of calorie labeling on physical activity and the dietary behaviors discussed above. The diet-related estimates (columns 3-4 in Table VI ) imply a net reduction in caloric intake of about 4 calories per day and the exercise-related estimate (column 2 in Table VI ) implies an increase in caloric expenditure of about 19 calories per day. Assuming that the net effect of these behavioral changes is equivalent to a reduction in caloric intake of 23 calories per day, I estimate that, holding all else constant, for an average person in my sample, a persistent reduction in caloric intake of 23 calories per day for a year would reduce weight by about 0.6 kg.
46 This exercise suggests that such changes in physical activity and diet related to the consumption of alcoholic beverages, fruits, and vegetables would explain less than half of the body-weight effects estimated here.
47
To get a better sense of the magnitude of the estimated effect of calorie labeling on body weight, I perform another back-of-the-envelope calculation, which uses the implied body-weight impact estimate from a study (Bollinger et al., 2011) that analyzes the effect of calorie labeling on calories purchased in chain restaurants. Their study is perhaps the best one to use for this purpose because they analyzed detailed transaction-level data for all Starbucks locations in a city that was affected by the policy and their data span a lengthy period of time (10 months) after the policy was implemented. They estimated that calorie labeling caused a 6% reduction in calories purchased per transaction.
If we assume that calorie labeling caused calories purchased to fall by 6% in all chain restaurants in NY counties that implemented calorie labeling laws, then the estimated reduction in total calorie consumption would amount to 38 calories per day. 48 This exercise indicates that such a change in chain restaurant consumption for a year would explain about 84% of the average body-weight effect of calorie labeling estimated here. As discussed above, in addition to demand-side changes, supply-side responses to calorie labeling laws may also explain a portion of the estimated impact of calorie labeling on body weight. 42 Recent work indicates that the demand for cigarettes is derived from the demand for weight loss (Cawley et al., 2016) and that smoking has a causal impact on BMI (Courtemanche et al., 2016b) . 43 Similarly, I find that the estimated effects of calorie labeling on someday (coef À0.009, s.e. 0.007) and everyday smoking (coef 0.006, s.e. 0.012) participation are small and statistically insignificant. 44 This estimate accounts for dynamic physiological adaptations that occur with decreases in body weight à la Hall et al. (2011) . 45 In 2010, USDA's Economic Research Service estimated that on average Americans consume about 2544 calories per day (see http:// www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/food-availability-%28per-capita%29-data-system/summary-findings.aspx, last accessed May 14, 2016). 46 This estimated weight-loss calculation is also based on the work of Hall et al. (2011) . Hall et al. (2011) point out that an increase in physical activity will not necessarily lead to the same weight loss resulting from an energy-equivalent decrease in caloric intake because the energy expenditure that results from greater physical activity is proportional to body weight. 47 I also conducted an (unreported) analysis of the exercise and dietary behaviors by demographic sub-group and I reached a similar conclusion-changes in these behaviors in response to implementation of calorie labeling laws do not explain the patterns shown in Table V . 48 This calculation is based on the following additional assumptions: (i) 25% of an average American's calorie consumption comes from chain restaurants; (ii) reductions in calorie consumption are not offset by increases in other meals; and (iii) the average daily intake is 2544 calories.
The impacts of local calorie labeling laws and NLEA on body weight
A closely related study by Variyam and Cawley (2006) found that, while implementation of NLEA on average did not reduce body weight, it was associated with a decrease in BMI among non-Hispanic white females. It is unclear why implementation of NLEA significantly reduced the body weight of only one segment of the population. Why might calorie labeling laws lead to a stronger average response of body weight? Packaged food labels contain much more nutrition information than do point-of-purchase chain restaurant menus, which may reduce the impact of calorie information on calories purchased. 49 The NYC Health Department, for example, considered mandating chain restaurants to post additional nutrition information (e.g. saturated fat and sodium), but decided to mandate the posting of only calories because posting other nutrition information 'risked reducing the impact of the calorie information on obesity' (Farley et al., 2009). 50 Relatedly, it is possible that the shock to the average consumers' nutrition information set generated by calorie labeling laws is more impactful for body-weight regulation than the corresponding shock generated by NLEA. Most consumers underestimate the number of calories contained in meals prepared away from home and underestimation of calories tends to be greatest for high-calorie menu items (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2009 ). Even well-trained nutrition experts routinely and substantially underestimate the number of calories in restaurant meals (Backstrand et al., 1997) .
Study limitations
This study has several limitations. First, while some mechanisms have been ruled out, the analysis does not pin down the mechanisms that drive the body-weight impacts estimated here. Second, the BRFSS does not contain a measure of total caloric intake and the dietary data captured in the BRFSS account for about 15% of total energy intake (Block, 2004) , so I am unable to provide a complete picture of the effects of calorie labeling on dietary behavior. Third, the BRFSS lacks information on where the consumption of the food and beverage items captured in the data took place, so it is not possible to separately identify calories consumed at home versus away from home. Fourth, because the individuals who are actually 'treated' in treatment counties cannot be identified in the data, I am unable to estimate effects on the treated and make an internal comparison of treatment-on-the-treated effects to the intention-to-treat effects estimated here. Fifth, BMI measures are based on self-reported rather than measured height and weight, which would allow for more accurate healthy and unhealthy body weight categorizations.
CONCLUSION
This study sheds light on whether mandatory calorie labeling laws have the potential to curb the obesity epidemic. The analysis indicates that on average the local NY jurisdictions that implemented a mandatory calorie labeling law were successful in reducing BMI and the risk of obesity. The analysis also suggests that the mandate may have had a larger impact on the body weight of lower income individuals, especially lower income minorities. The results here apply to NY, but an important policy implication of this study is that federal menu labeling regulations may help to reduce body weight throughout the U.S. and may be more impactful among some groups. That said, if the average body-weight impact of federal menu labeling regulations across U.S. states is similar to the relatively modest average body-weight impact of local calorie labeling laws rolled out in NY counties, menu labeling alone is unlikely to be sufficient to reverse the obesity epidemic.
